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Abstract 
Compared to traditional fee-for-service Medicare (FFS), private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans offer 
additional health insurance coverage but restrict access to medical providers. This study measured how 
MA enrollment, relative to FFS enrollment, may influence mortality for cancer patients. The study used 
linked data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program and Medicare 
administration (SEER-Medicare) including diagnoses between 2006 and 2011 at all four major cancer 
sites (breast, colorectal, lung, prostate). The key innovation of the study was to measure and account 
for variation in prescription drug coverage between MA and FFS cancer patients. Among cancer 
patients with Part D coverage, MA enrollment was associated with modestly increased mortality. The 
estimated relationships were statistically distinguishable from zero for lung cancer and (in most model 
specifications) colorectal cancer. The findings are consistent with a hypothesis that restricted provider 
access may reduce health outcomes for patients who already have a serious illness.  
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1.
 
Introduction 
There has been a recent policy shift in the US to favor the use of private companies to administer health 
insurance. Between Medicare Parts A and B, Medicare Part D, Medicaid, and the health insurance 
marketplaces, over 100 million people in the US now have public health insurance that is administered by 
a private insurer. In Medicare, private and publicly administered insurance operate in parallel. Medicare 
beneficiaries elect to receive their combined Part A and Part B coverage in one of two ways. About 70 
percent of current beneficiaries enroll in the public plan, traditional fee-for-service Medicare (FFS). 
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The remaining 30 percent enroll in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan offered by a private company.  
MA plans offer coverage beyond what is provided by FFS in exchange for restricting access to medical 
providers. MA plans thus allow patients to obtain supplemental coverage by sacrificing provider access, 
typically at little to no extra financial cost. Due to data constraints, researchers have very limited 
understanding of what provider networks look like in MA plans. Jacobson, Trilling, Neuman, Damico 
and Gold (2016) manually collected provider network data, from PDF files or searchable directories 
embedded within company websites, for the MA plans in 20 counties in 2015. They found that provider 
network breadth varied significantly by plan. About one-sixth of MA enrollees had coverage that 
applied to less than 30 percent of the hospitals in their county, about two-thirds of MA enrollees had 
coverage that applied to somewhere between 30 and 70 percent of the hospitals in their county, and the 
remaining one-sixth had coverage that applied to more than 70 percent of the hospitals in their county. 
New research shows that MA plans save 10 to 25 percent in costs relative to FFS (Curto, Einav, Levin, & 
Bhattacharya, 2014; Curto, Einav, Finkelstein, Levin, & Bhattacharya, 2017). The savings is likely due 
to the limited provider networks. MA patients use less care overall and substitute less expensive types of 
care (e.g., primary care) for more expensive types of care (e.g., specialist care) compared to FFS patients 
(Curto et al., 2017). In other contexts, it has been found that limited provider networks tend to produce 
similar effects (Atwood & Lo Sasso, 2016; Gruber & McKnight, 2016). The natural question that follows 
is whether less utilization, particularly for specialized types of care, in MA plans reduces quality of care 
for patients with major illness. This study uses cancer patients as a case study to begin to answer this 
question.  
Health insurance is specifically meant to provide financial protection in the case of a health shock, such 
as a cancer diagnosis. Cancer is one of the deadliest and costliest chronic conditions. It is also one of 
the most researched conditions, which leads to frequent advances in cancer care. However, managed 
care organizations (like MA plans) may discourage the use or adoption of high-cost, innovative 
treatments (Baker, 2001; Baker & Phibbs, 2002; Goodman & Stano, 2016; and Mobley et al., 2011) and, 
relatedly, may limit access to specialized cancer care providers. 
There are a number of studies that show more specialized cancer care leads to better outcomes. The 
best survival outcomes for ovarian cancer patients result from treatment by a gynecologic oncologist 
(Chan et al., 2007). Similarly, surgeon specialization improves survival for breast cancer (Gillis & Hole, 
1996), colorectal cancer (McArdle & Hole, 2004), and lung cancer (Goodney, Lucas, Stukel, & 
Birkmeyer, 2005; and Sahni, Dalton, Cutler, Birkmeyer, & Chandra, 2016). If MA plans did limit 
access to specialized care, it is then plausible that they might increase mortality for cancer patients.  
1.1 New Contribution 
Previous studies have found no apparent relationship between enrollment in Medicare HMOs and 
cancer mortality (Potosky et al., 1997; Merrill et al., 1999; Potosky et al., 1999; Roetzheim et al., 2000; 
Roetzheim et al., 2000; Lee-Feldstein, Feldstein, Buchmueller, & Katterhagen, 2001; Lee-Feldstein, 
Feldstein, & Buchmueller, 2002; and Roetzheim et al., 2008). Unlike this study, these prior studies 
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generally focused on older time periods and were thus unable to control for prescription drug coverage. 
The main contribution of this study was to condition on prescription drug coverage, particularly 
Medicare Part D coverage, when examining the relationship between MA enrollment and mortality. 
This methodological enhancement led to a new conclusion, that (conditional on having Medicare Part 
D) MA enrollment is associated with increased mortality for cancer patients. 
The importance of controlling for prescription drug coverage was previously demonstrated by 
Gowrisankaran, Town and Barrette (2011), who found that the combination of MA and Part D coverage 
was associated with lower mortality than FFS coverage but MA coverage without Part D was 
associated with higher mortality than FFS coverage. Unlike this study, Gowrisankaran, Town and 
Barrette (2011) did not distinguish Part D enrollment among FFS patients and also were not primarily 
focused on cancer patients. 
 
2. Study Data 
This study used linked data from the cancer registries of the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End 
Results (SEER) Program and Medicare administrative records. For the requested cancer sites and years 
of diagnosis, the data include all Medicare-eligible individuals living in counties within a SEER 
registry region who were diagnosed with cancer. The SEER registry regions cover various urban and 
rural geographic areas that together comprise 28 percent of the US population. In those regions, this 
study examined patients diagnosed with the four most prevalent cancers (breast, colorectal, lung, and 
prostate) between 2006 and 2011. Together, these cancers accounted for over half of all first cancer 
diagnoses that were recorded in SEER during the study period. 
2.1 Sample 
The unit of observation in the study was a patient and only first cancer diagnoses were included, so all 
observations represented unique patients. In order to have MA enrollment in the year of cancer 
diagnosis be defined for all patients, patients who were first diagnosed with cancer before turning age 
65 were excluded. Since dual coverage is related to mortality and likely changes the tradeoff between 
MA and FFS, patients who were dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare at any time in the study 
period (about 15 percent of patients) were excluded. Finally, patients were excluded if they were ever 
eligible for Medicare due to a disability or end-stage renal disease, were diagnosed at an age older than 
90, were not enrolled in both Medicare Parts A and B, were missing critical information such as county 
of residence or date of diagnosis, or had their diagnosis information taken from a death certificate, 
autopsy, or nursing home. About 20 percent of patients were excluded due to these criteria. The 
resulting sample consisted of 344,173 cancer patients, with 70 percent of those patients being covered 
by FFS at diagnosis and the other 30 percent being covered by an MA plan at diagnosis.  
As discussed at the end of this section, a descriptive analysis of the relationship between Medicare Part 
D enrollment, MA enrollment, and mortality led to an additional sample restriction for the statistical 
analyses. In particular, patients without Part D coverage at the time of their cancer diagnoses were 
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excluded from the statistical analyses. The final sample for the statistical analysis thus included 
181,256 cancer patients, 50.7 percent of whom were covered by FFS at diagnosis. 
2.2 Mortality Measures 
The outcome of interest was mortality. Cancer diagnoses in the sample ranged from 2006 through 2011 
and mortality (taken from the Medicare administrative data) follow-up lasted through 2013, so each 
patient had at least two-years of follow-up and some had up to 8 years.  
The study used multiple measures of mortality, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The 
simplest mortality measure was an uncensored indicator for death by any cause within two years of 
cancer diagnosis. Since MA patients tend to be healthier than FFS patients, even conditional on patient 
characteristics and chronic conditions (see Newhouse, Price, McWilliams, Hsu, & Mcguire, 2015; for 
an excellent summary of the Medicare selection literature), the statistical model would ideally control 
for patients’ non-cancer comorbidities. Unfortunately, however, this information is not available. The 
SEER registries do not collect information on comorbidities and the Medicare claims data only 
includes FFS patients. Because differential non-cancer health is not addressed, estimates from this 
measure should be considered a lower bound.  
In the absence of comorbidity measures, information about cause of death was used to (at least partially) 
control for selection related to non-cancer health. The SEER registries use algorithms that process 
cause of death from death certificate data (Note 1). If a cancer patient dies from something unrelated to 
their cancer, an all-causes mortality measure considers that the same as it does a death caused by cancer. 
Cancer-caused mortality measures, on the other hand, consider the two causes of death to be different. 
The second mortality measure used in the study was an indicator for death caused by cancer within two 
years of cancer diagnosis. This measure implicitly, and likely inaccurately, assumes that all patients 
who died from something unrelated to cancer would not have died from cancer within two years of 
cancer diagnosis. Because of this, estimates from this measure should be considered an upper bound. 
The two other mortality measures used were similar to the two discussed above, except placed in a 
framework of a hazard model in order to address censoring. They are discussed in the Cox Proportional 
Hazards: Methodology and Results section.  
2.3 Key Independent Variables 
The independent variable of interest was MA enrollment during the year of cancer diagnosis. While 
patients can switch between MA and FFS over time, switching is rare. Over the same time frame as this 
study, Lissenden (2018) found that a cancer diagnosis induced more switches to FFS and less switches 
to MA in the year after cancer diagnosis, but no detectable change in switching behavior in the year of 
cancer diagnosis. This is because switching was generally not allowed within a calendar year in these 
years. Thus, enrollment in the year of cancer diagnosis reflects a decision the patient made prior to 
being diagnosed with cancer. Sensitivity models that defined MA enrollment from the year prior to 
cancer diagnosis or excluded all switchers (at any point before or after cancer diagnosis) produced 
results that were similar to the preferred models. 
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A key confounder related to both MA enrollment and cancer mortality is prescription drug coverage. 
Prescription drug coverage decreases mortality for Medicare (cancer and other) patients 
(Gowrisankaran, Town, & Barrette, 2011). Prescription drug coverage also varies significantly between 
MA and FFS patients; the vast majority of MA patients have Medicare Part D included in their benefits 
but many FFS patients have alternative or no prescription drug coverage. Relative to previous studies 
measuring the relationship between MA enrollment and cancer mortality, the key advantage of this 
study is that prescription drug coverage is at least partially observed. In particular, it is observed 
whether or not each patient had Medicare Part D coverage when they were diagnosed with cancer. Over 
91% of the MA cancer patients in the study had Medicare Part D, but fewer than 45% of FFS cancer 
patients did. Many of the patients without Medicare Part D coverage may have had alternative 
prescription drug coverage, but this is unobservable in the data.  
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the observed two-year mortality rates for each of four subsamples of cancer 
patients: FFS without Part D, FFS with Part D, MA with Part D, and MA without Part D. For all four 
cancer types and regardless of MA or FFS coverage, it is clear that patients with Part D coverage are 
much more likely to survive at least two years than patients without Part D coverage. This is consistent 
with Gowrisankaran, Town and Barrette (2011). Given that Part D coverage is related to mortality, and 
that there are so few MA patients without Part D coverage, the focus of the study is on patients with 
Part D coverage. MA and FFS patients without Part D coverage are dropped from the analysis sample.  
Among MA and FFS patients with Part D coverage (the second and third columns of Table 1), survival 
rates were similar (within one percentage point) for MA and FFS patients with breast cancer, colorectal 
cancer, and prostate cancer. For lung cancer, the deadliest of the four major cancers, 32.1% of FFS 
patients with Part D coverage survived compared to only 29.2% of MA patients with Part D coverage. 
In other words, conditional on having Part D coverage, MA coverage was associated with a 2.9 
percentage point (9 percent) higher chance of dying within two years after a lung cancer diagnosis. 
 
Table 1. Two-Year Mortality Rates by Cancer Site and Insurance Type 
 
Fee-for-Service 
without  
Part D 
Fee-for-Service 
with  
Part D 
Medicare 
Advantage with 
Part D 
Medicare 
Advantage 
without Part D 
Breast Cancer     
  # Total Patients 32,090 25,443 23,047 2,189 
  # Died from cancer 1,860 (5.8%) 1,081 (4.2%) 970 (4.2%) 224 (10.2%) 
  # Died from other 1,328 (4.1%) 980 (3.9%) 790 (3.4%) 109 (5.0%) 
  # Survived 28,902 (90.1%) 23,382 (91.9%) 21,287 (92.4%) 1,856 (84.8%) 
Colorectal Cancer     
  # Total Patients 26,210 15,697 16,463 2,288 
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  # Died from cancer 6,581 (25.1%) 3,081 (19.6%) 3,368 (20.5%) 897 (39.2%) 
  # Died from other 2,482 (9.5%) 1,276 (8.1%) 1,160 (7.0%) 289 (12.6%) 
  # Survived 17,147 (65.4%) 11,340 (72.2%) 11,935 (72.5%) 1,102 (48.2%) 
Lung Cancer     
  # Total Patients 40,812 21,861 20,151 4,767 
  # Died from cancer 27,011 (66.2%) 12,960 (59.3%) 12,684 (62.9%) 3,695 (77.5%) 
  # Died from other 3,929 (9.6%) 1,893 (8.7%) 1,587 (7.9%) 459 (9.6%) 
  # Survived 9,872 (24.2%) 7,008 (32.1%) 5,880 (29.2%) 613 (12.9%) 
Prostate Cancer     
  # Total Patients 51,107 28,921 29,673 3,454 
  # Died from cancer 1,690 (3.3%) 761 (2.6%) 970 (3.3%) 184 (5.3%) 
  # Died from other 2,349 (4.6%) 1,099 (3.8%) 1,144 (3.9%) 188 (5.4%) 
  # Survived 47,068 (92.1%) 27,061 (93.6%) 27,559 (92.9%) 3,082 (89.2%) 
Source: Author’s analysis of 2006-2011 SEER Medicare data, first cancer diagnoses. Insurance status is 
measured during the year of the patient’s first cancer diagnosis. 
 
3. Linear Regression: Methodology and Results 
The goal of this section is to measure how MA enrollment relates to mortality conditional on 
observable patient characteristics that may influence mortality. In particular, a linear regression was 
used with control variables for health service area (HSA), age band, sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, 
measures of socioeconomic status, year of diagnosis, and measures of cancer site and severity. 
Non-cancer comorbidities were unobserved, but as discussed in the previous section, the use of both 
all-causes (lower bound) and cancer-caused mortality (upper bound) outcomes help to understand the 
implications of any resulting bias.  
There were two socioeconomic variables measured based on the census tract in which the patient lived 
at the time of their diagnosis; the percent of residents without a high school degree and the percent of 
residents with a college degree. The other control variables were all categorical. The HSAs were 
defined using county of residence and the mapping from the National Cancer Institute, which is meant 
to represent service areas for cancer treatment. There were several SEER variables used to measure 
cancer severity: summary stage, cancer grade, and, for breast cancers, estrogen and progesterone 
receptivity. Sensitivity models that measured cancer severity more granularly, using SEER’s derived 
American Joint Committee on Cancer 6th edition stage groupings, produced results that were similar to 
the preferred models. 
3.1 Summary of Control Variables 
Table 2 summarizes patient demographic characteristics, which were generally similar between MA 
and FFS patients with Part D coverage. The exceptions are that MA patients were more likely to be 
black or Hispanic and live in less-educated census tracts.  
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Table 2. Summary of Patient Characteristics at Time of Cancer Diagnosis 
Variable 
Medicare Advantage Patients 
N = 89,334 
Fee-for-Service Patients 
N = 91,922 
Age 65-69 0.218 0.221 
Age 70-74 0.276 0.278 
Age 75-79 0.241 0.224 
Age 80-84 0.165 0.170 
Age 85+ 0.099 0.108 
Female 0.468 0.505 
Black 0.081 0.046 
Hispanic 0.096 0.032 
Married 0.561 0.564 
No High School Degree (CT) 0.179 (0.132) 0.165 (0.115) 
At Least 4 Years of College (CT) 0.278 (0.169) 0.286 (0.180) 
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). All variables are binary indicators except the two 
educational attainment variables, which are measured as the proportion of residents in the patient’s 
census tract. The values shown are the means. For the two continuous variables at the bottom of the table, 
the sample standard deviations are shown in parentheses. All variables are measured at the time of the 
patient’s cancer diagnosis. 
 
Table 3 summarizes cancer type, including site and severity. Compared to FFS patients, MA patients 
were more likely to have colorectal or prostate cancer rather than breast or lung cancer. Within each of 
the four sites, however, the distribution of cancer severity was similar between MA and FFS patients.  
 
Table 3. Summary of Cancer Severity at Time of Cancer Diagnosis 
Variable 
Medicare Advantage 
Patients 
Fee-for-Service 
Patients 
Breast Cancer N = 23,047 N = 25,443 
     Local, Grade 1, ER+, PR+ 0.160 0.160 
     Local, Grade 1, ER+, PR- 0.021 0.019 
     Local, Grade 1, ER missing, PR missing 0.010 0.012 
     Local, Grade 2, ER+, PR+ 0.227 0.233 
     Local, Grade 2, ER+, PR- 0.037 0.035 
     Local, Grade 2, ER-, PR- 0.021 0.019 
     Local, Grade 2, ER missing, PR missing 0.018 0.017 
     Local, Grade 3, ER+, PR+ 0.064 0.071 
     Local, Grade 3, ER+, PR- 0.022 0.021 
     Local, Grade 3, ER-, PR- 0.053 0.057 
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     Local, Grade 3, ER missing, PR missing 0.008 0.010 
     Local, Grade missing, ER+, PR+ 0.024 0.030 
     Local, Grade missing, ER missing, PR 
missing 
0.017 0.020 
     Regional, Grade 1, ER+, PR+ 0.024 0.025 
     Regional, Grade 2, ER+, PR+ 0.071 0.065 
     Regional, Grade 2, ER+, PR- 0.014 0.011 
     Regional, Grade 3, ER+, PR+ 0.029 0.029 
     Regional, Grade 3, ER+, PR- 0.010 0.010 
     Regional, Grade 3, ER-, PR- 0.024 0.021 
Colorectal N = 16,463 N = 15,697 
     Local, Grade 1 0.063 0.056 
     Local, Grade 2 0.271 0.277 
     Local, Grade 3 0.038 0.045 
     Local, Grade missing 0.096 0.083 
     Regional, Grade 1 0.020 0.017 
     Regional, Grade 2 0.214 0.215 
     Regional, Grade 3 0.073 0.079 
     Regional, Grade 4 0.008 0.011 
     Regional, Grade missing 0.013 0.013 
     Distant, Grade 2 0.079 0.078 
     Distant, Grade 3 0.035 0.039 
     Distant, Grade missing 0.041 0.037 
     Stage missing, Grade 2 0.011 0.013 
     Stage missing, Grade missing 0.018 0.017 
Lung N = 20,151 N = 21,861 
     Local, Grade 1 0.028 0.032 
     Local, Grade 2 0.055 0.062 
     Local, Grade 3 0.049 0.053 
     Local, Grade missing 0.062 0.067 
     Regional, Grade 1 0.011 0.011 
     Regional, Grade 2 0.052 0.057 
     Regional, Grade 3 0.074 0.074 
     Regional, Grade 4 0.009 0.010 
     Regional, Grade missing 0.094 0.094 
     Distant, Grade 1 0.011 0.010 
     Distant, Grade 2 0.042 0.039 
     Distant, Grade 3 0.104 0.101 
     Distant, Grade 4 0.022 0.024 
     Distant, Grade missing 0.331 0.312 
     Stage missing, Grade missing 0.044 0.039 
Prostate N = 29,673 N = 28,921 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf         Journal of Economics and Public Finance                     Vol. 5, No. 3, 2019 
301 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
     Local/Regional, Grade 2 0.392 0.378 
     Local/Regional, Grade 3 0.483 0.514 
     Local/Regional, Grade missing 0.020 0.021 
     Distant, Grade 3 0.030 0.024 
     Distant, Grade missing 0.015 0.013 
     Stage missing, Grade 2 0.019 0.012 
     Stage missing, Grade 3  0.019 0.014 
     Stage missing, Grade missing 0.011 0.012 
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). All variables are binary indicators. Only variables with 
frequencies of at least 1% among either Medicare Advantage of Fee-for-Service patients are shown, 
within cancer site, are shown. The values shown are the frequencies (i.e., means). All variables are 
measured at the time of the patient’s cancer diagnosis. 
 
The variable with the most notable difference between MA and FFS patients was the HSA variable. It is 
well known that the popularity of MA plans varies geographically. The regression model used HSA 
fixed effects in order to account for this variation. Table 4 summarizes characteristics of HSAs at the 
patient level in order to illustrate differences between MA and FFS patients, but these variables are not 
used in the model (due to the inclusion of HSA fixed effects) (Note 2). MA patients lived in HSAs that 
were nearly twice as large, in terms of population, as the HSAs that FFS patients lived in on average. 
This is not surprising since MA plans are most popular in urban areas. MA patients also had more 
physicians, radiation oncologists, hospitals, and hospitals with cancer programs within their HSA than 
FFS patients. This does not necessarily imply that MA patients had more choice with respect to cancer 
care, however, since MA plans limit access through their provider networks. Unfortunately, data 
measuring provider networks for MA plans is not readily available for researchers. 
 
Table 4. Summary of Health Service Areas at Time of Diagnosis 
 
Medicare Advantage Patients 
N = 89,334 
Fee-for-Service Patients  
N = 91,922 
Population 3.1 million (3.0 million)  1.7 million (2.2 million)  
# Physicians 2,303 (2,128)  1,324 (1,642)  
# Radiation Oncologists 46 (47)  27 (36) 
# Hospitals 35 (33) 21 (24) 
# Hospitals with Cancer Programs 9 (7)  6 (6)  
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). The table summarizes, at the individual level, 
characteristics of HSAs where the individuals in the sample reside. Means are shown, with standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
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3.2 Results 
Tables 5A (all-causes mortality) and 5B (cancer-caused mortality) report the linear regression estimates. 
The estimates from the model that includes the control variables are the preferred estimates. The 
estimates for all-causes mortality (Table 5A) are all positive, but (similar to Table 1) only the estimate 
for lung cancer patients is statistically distinguishable from zero with a 5 percent threshold. The 
estimates for cancer-caused mortality (Table 5B) are also all positive, and the estimates for colorectal 
cancer and lung cancer patients are both statistically distinguishable from zero with a 1 percent 
threshold. 
Interpreting the all-causes mortality estimates as a lower bound and the cancer-caused mortality 
estimates as an upper bound, the results imply that (conditional on having Part D coverage and 
controlling for observable patient demographics and cancer severity) MA enrollment was associated 
with a 1.1 to 1.9 percentage point (3 to 6 percent) higher chance of dying within two years after a lung 
cancer diagnosis. Similarly, MA enrollment was associated with a 0.8 to 1.3 percentage point (1 to 2 
percent) higher chance of dying within two years after a colorectal cancer diagnosis. There were similar, 
but smaller and statistically insignificant associations, among patients with breast or prostate cancer. 
 
Table 5A. Relationship between Medicare Advantage Enrollment and Two-Year All-Causes 
Mortality 
Variable Breast Cancer  Colorectal Cancer Lung Cancer  Prostate Cancer 
Medicare 
Advantage 
-0.0046* 
(0.0028) 
0.0017 
(0.0028) 
-0.0025 
(0.0050) 
0.0084* 
(0.0049) 
0.0288*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0109** 
(0.0048) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0030 
(0.0021) 
Female  
-0.0561*** 
(0.0167) 
 
-0.0375*** 
(0.0043) 
 
-0.0682*** 
(0.0041) 
  
Black  
0.0116* 
(0.0064) 
 
0.0254** 
(0.0100) 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0082) 
 
0.0080** 
(0.0040) 
Hispanic  
-0.0063 
(0.0048) 
 
-0.0059 
(0.0087) 
 
-0.0023 
(0.0099) 
 
-0.0068* 
(0.0035) 
Married  
-0.0093*** 
(0.0028) 
 
-0.0350*** 
(0.0057) 
 
-0.0463*** 
(0.0048) 
 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0025) 
Widowed  
0.0034 
(0.0035) 
 
0.0035 
(0.0069) 
 
-0.0078 
(0.0058) 
 
0.0232*** 
(0.0055) 
(CT) % No 
College 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(CT) % 4 Years 
of College 
 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
Fixed Effects         
Age (integer)  x  x  x  x 
Year of 
Diagnosis 
 x  x  x  x 
Health Service 
Area 
 x  x  x  x 
Summary Stage 
x Grade x 
ER/PR Status 
 x  x  x  x 
Sample Size 48,490 48,490 32,160 32,160 42,012 42,012 58,594 58,594 
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The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). An observation is an individual. The outcome variable is 
an indicator for death occurring within 2 years after the individual’s first cancer diagnosis. The 
Medicare Advantage enrollment variable is measured in the year of cancer diagnosis. The educational 
attainment variables are measured as the proportion of individuals in the patient’s census tract who 
meet the criteria. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county×year-of-diagnosis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5B. Relationship between Medicare Advantage Enrollment and Two-Year Cancer-Caused 
Mortality 
Variable Breast Cancer  Colorectal Cancer Lung Cancer  Prostate Cancer 
Medicare 
Advantage 
-0.0004 
(0.0020) 
0.0029 
(0.0019) 
0.0083* 
(0.0045) 
0.0127*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0366*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0186*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0024* 
(0.0014) 
Female  
-0.0179 
(0.0116) 
 
-0.0057 
(0.0036) 
 
-0.0479*** 
(0.0044) 
  
Black  
0.0075* 
(0.0044) 
 
0.0176** 
(0.0087) 
 
-0.0069 
(0.0091) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0026) 
Hispanic  
-0.0008 
(0.0039) 
 
0.0040 
(0.0081) 
 
0.0040 
(0.0101) 
 
0.0018 
(0.0023) 
Married  
-0.0026 
(0.0020) 
 
-0.0171*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0334*** 
(0.0052) 
 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
Widowed  
0.0031 
(0.0026) 
 
0.0030 
(0.0061) 
 
-0.0037 
(0.0065) 
 
0.0160*** 
(0.0038) 
(CT) % No 
College 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(CT) % 4 Years 
of College 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Fixed Effects         
Age (integer)  x  x  x  x 
Year of 
Diagnosis 
 x  x  x  x 
Health Service 
Area 
 x  x  x  x 
Summary Stage 
x Grade x 
ER/PR Status 
 x  x  x  x 
Sample Size 48,490 48,490 32,160 32,160 42,012 42,012 58,594 58,594 
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). An observation is an individual. The outcome variable is 
an indicator for a death, caused by cancer, occurring within 2 years after the individual’s first cancer 
diagnosis. The Medicare Advantage enrollment variable is measured in the year of cancer diagnosis. 
The educational attainment variables are measured as the proportion of individuals in the patient’s 
census tract who meet the criteria. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by 
county×year-of-diagnosis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4. Cox Proportional Hazards: Methodology and Results 
As shown in the previous section, the choice between all-causes or cancer-caused mortality as the 
outcome has a small but clinically meaningful impact on the estimates. This is presumably due to bias 
that results from MA cancer patients having more non-cancer comorbidities (or, more generally, poorer 
non-cancer health) than FFS cancer patients. In the absence of data on non-cancer comorbidities, the 
preferred approach to address this bias is to use a Cox proportional hazards model that treats 
non-cancer deaths as censoring events. Unlike with a linear regression model, which cannot address 
right-censoring, no assumption is needed regarding future survival for patients who die for reasons 
unrelated to their cancer. 
4.1 Methodology 
Unlike the linear regression that modeled the probability of death within two years after cancer 
diagnosis, the hazard rate modeled in the Cox proportional hazards model is the probability of death in 
the nth month after cancer diagnosis given survival through the (n-1)st month.  The Cox proportional 
hazards model is the simplest and most popular hazard model. It does not impose any assumptions 
regarding the underlying hazard rate. Instead, it only assumes that the relationship between the key 
variable(s) and the hazard rate is proportional to survival duration. Schoenfield residuals are commonly 
used to statistically test this assumption and the Schoenfield test for this study revealed no evidence 
against the proportionality assumption. 
Similar to fixed effects in a linear regression, covariates can be used as stratifiers in a linear regression. 
Stratifiers do not have a coefficient that is estimated and need not have a true relationship with the 
hazard rate this is proportional to survival duration. All of the variables that were used as fixed effects 
in the linear regression model (age, year of diagnosis, HSA, and cancer severity) were used as 
stratifiers in the Cox proportional hazards model. 
4.2 Results 
Tables 6A (all-causes mortality) and 6B (cancer-caused mortality) report the estimates from the Cox 
proportional hazards models. Again, the estimates from the models that include the control variables 
are the preferred estimates. For lung and prostate cancers, the estimates from the model without any 
control variables are similar to the estimates from the model with control variables. For breast and 
colorectal cancers, the inclusion of the control variables increases the estimates. This suggests that MA 
breast and colorectal cancer patients, compared to FFS breast and colorectal cancer patients, have 
observed characteristics besides insurance type that are associated with lower hazard rates (Note 3). 
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Table 6A. Relationship between Medicare Advantage Enrollment and Hazard of All-Cause 
Mortality 
Variable Breast Cancer  Colorectal Cancer Lung Cancer  Prostate Cancer 
Medicare 
Advantage 
-0.0553** 
(0.0239) 
0.1190* 
(0.0680) 
-0.0420*** 
(0.0162) 
0.1154*** 
(0.0406) 
0.0803*** 
(0.0135) 
0.0892*** 
(0.0254) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0266) 
0.0553 
(0.0367) 
Female  
-0.5884** 
(0.2554) 
 
-0.3336** 
(0.0326) 
 
-0.1672*** 
(0.0222) 
  
Black  
0.1769 
(0.1162) 
 
0.1210* 
(0.0675) 
 
-0.0923** 
(0.0430) 
 
0.0546 
(0.0520) 
Hispanic  
-0.3081** 
(0.1225) 
 
-0.0792 
(0.0864) 
 
-0.0194 
(0.0500) 
 
-0.2272*** 
(0.0592) 
Married  
-.2536*** 
(0.0711) 
 
-.2417*** 
(0.0483) 
 
-0.1912*** 
(0.0311) 
 
-0.2162*** 
(0.0328) 
Widowed  
-0.1129 
(0.0717) 
 
-0.0083 
(0.0494) 
 
0.0059 
(0.0306) 
 
0.1450** 
(0.0603) 
(CT) % No 
College 
 
0.0046 
(0.0031) 
 
-0.0012 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0018) 
 
0.0018 
(0.0022) 
(CT) % 4 Years 
of College 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0023) 
 
-0.0036* 
(0.0019) 
 
-0.0048*** 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.0081*** 
(0.0013) 
Stratifiers         
Age (integer)  x  x  x  x 
Year of 
Diagnosis 
 x  x  x  x 
Health Service 
Area 
 x  x  x  x 
Summary Stage 
x Grade x 
ER/PR Status 
 x  x  x  x 
Sample Size 48,490 48,490 32,160 32,160 42,012 42,012 58,594 58,594 
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). An observation is an individual. Estimates are from a 
stratified Cox proportional hazards model, with any death treated as an event. The Medicare Advantage 
enrollment variable is measured in the year of cancer diagnosis. The educational attainment variables 
are measured as the proportion of individuals in the patient’s census tract who meet the criteria. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county×year-of-diagnosis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6B. Relationship between Medicare Advantage Enrollment and Hazard of Cancer-Caused 
Mortality 
Variable Breast Cancer  Colorectal Cancer Lung Cancer  Prostate Cancer 
Medicare 
Advantage 
0.0151 
(0.0370) 
0.2963** 
(0.1237) 
0.0275 
(0.0223) 
0.1783*** 
(0.0530) 
0.0988*** 
(0.0159) 
0.1255*** 
(0.0266) 
0.1682*** 
(0.0457) 
0.1062 
(0.0833) 
Female  
-0.4573 
(0.5070) 
 
-0.1020** 
(0.0518) 
 
-0.1550*** 
(0.0245) 
  
Black  
0.3053 
(0.1911) 
 
0.2153** 
(0.0890) 
 
-0.0776* 
(0.0470) 
 
0.0287 
(0.1120) 
Hispanic  
-0.4642* 
(0.2433) 
 
0.1289 
(0.1322) 
 
-0.0190 
(0.0537) 
 
-0.1234 
(0.1059) 
Married  
-0.3424** 
(0.1407) 
 
-0.1561** 
(0.0690) 
 
-0.1829*** 
(0.0311) 
 
-0.2169*** 
(0.0830) 
Widowed  
0.0113 
(0.1571) 
 
-0.0185 
(0.0788) 
 
0.0078 
(0.0313) 
 
-0.0125 
(0.1342) 
(CT) % No 
College 
 
0.0111* 
(0.0065) 
 
-0.0017 
(0.0029) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0092** 
(0.0041) 
(CT) % 4 Years 
of College 
 
0.0044 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0048* 
(0.0026) 
 
-0.0045*** 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.0040 
(0.0034) 
Stratifiers         
Age (integer)  x  x  x  x 
Year of 
Diagnosis 
 x  x  x  x 
Health Service 
Area 
 x  x  x  x 
Summary Stage 
x Grade x 
ER/PR Status 
 x  x  x  x 
Sample Size 48,490 48,490 32,160 32,160 42,012 42,012 58,594 58,594 
The sample is restricted to Medicare Advantage and Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage). An observation is an individual. Estimates are from a 
stratified Cox proportional hazards model, with a cancer-caused death treated as an event and any other 
death treated as censoring. The Medicare Advantage enrollment variable is measured in the year of 
cancer diagnosis. The educational attainment variables are measured as the proportion of individuals in 
the patient’s census tract who meet the criteria. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by 
county×year-of-diagnosis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
All of the preferred Cox estimates (i.e., the ones with control variables included in the model) are 
greater than zero. The estimates for colorectal and lung cancers, for both all-causes and cancer-caused 
mortality, are distinguishable from zero with a 1 percent statistical threshold. The breast cancer 
estimate for cancer-caused mortality is distinguishable from zero with a 5 percent statistical threshold 
but the breast cancer estimate for all-causes mortality is only distinguishable from zero with a 10 
percent statistical threshold. The prostate cancer estimates are not distinguishable from zero with any 
conventional statistical threshold.  
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For lung cancer patients, MA enrollment was associated with an 8.9 percent increased hazard of dying 
from any cause and a 12.6 percent increased hazard of dying from cancer. For colorectal cancer patients, 
MA enrollment was associated with an 11.5 percent increased hazard of dying from any cause and a 17.8 
percent increased hazard of dying from cancer.  
 
5. Limitations 
This study had several limitations. Though the statistical analysis attempted to minimize selection bias, 
this was an observational study. A causal interpretation of the estimates requires a key assumption that 
no unobserved factors increase (decrease) the likelihood of enrolling in MA plans and decrease 
(increase) the time between diagnosis and death for patients who are ultimately diagnosed with cancer. 
Factors that could influence mortality for cancer patients, such as financial resources, family support, 
severity of cancer, and comorbid conditions, may not have been perfectly controlled for due to data 
limitations. To the extent that residual components of these or other factors (a) vary between MA and FFS 
cancer patients and (b) influence mortality for cancer patients, the results of the study may not represent 
a causal effect of MA enrollment. Other limitations are described below. 
First, this study only considered patients who were already diagnosed with cancer and thus focused 
only on post-diagnosis cancer care. Preventive aspects of cancer care, such as living a healthy lifestyle 
and adhering to recommended cancer screenings, are critical in reducing the chance of a cancer-related 
death but were not the focus of this study. Other studies have found evidence that MA enrollment 
increases the likelihood of screening for cancer, likely because MA plans have historically reduced 
patient cost-sharing for cancer screening services (Baker, Phillips, Haas, Liang, & Sonneborn, 2004; 
and Rizzo, 2005). It is thus possible that MA enrollment may improve pre-diagnosis cancer care. 
However, it is important to note that routine cancer screening is not recommended or common for lung 
cancer. 
Second, the SEER-Medicare data is not a nationally representative sample. However, SEER regions 
contain over one-fourth of the US population. They are also similar to non-SEER regions in terms of 
cancer incidence by age and race (Kuo & Mobley, 2016), and in terms of MA penetration rates over 
time. Third, due to data constraints, this study was unable to adjust for quality of life. Fourth, this study 
was not able to examine any heterogeneity within types of MA plans. 
 
6. Discussion 
Conditional on having Medicare Part D and controlling for patient characteristics, MA enrollment was 
found to be associated with increased mortality for patients diagnosed with cancer. The most convincing 
statistical evidence was for lung cancer, followed by colorectal cancer. These two cancers, and especially 
lung cancer, are much more deadly than breast and prostate cancer on average.  
Like any observational study, the potential for selection bias due to unobserved factors must be taken 
seriously. However, a rich set of controls was used and the estimates (particularly for lung cancer cancer) 
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were not sensitive to those controls. Additionally, a large risk selection literature implies that any 
selection bias is most likely to understate any effect of MA enrollment to increase mortality. If the results 
of this study are driven by selection bias, it is a new selection bias that has not yet been documented in the 
literature. 
This study was unable to confirm a mechanism for the observed positive association between MA 
enrollment and mortality for cancer patients. One hypothesis, based on the trade-off of enhanced 
coverage but restricted provider access in MA plans compared to FFS, is that restricted provider access 
in MA plans increases mortality for patients with particularly deadly cancers that may benefit from 
access to particular specialists. Examining the implications of restricted provider access for vulnerable 
populations is a promising area for future work, particularly now that MA encounter data have become 
available to researchers (Note 4). In studies that were not restricted to cancer patients, evidence 
indicates that MA patients are admitted to lower-quality hospitals (Friedman & Jiang, 2010) and 
lower-quality nursing homes (Meyers, Mor, & Rahman, 2018) than FFS patients. 
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Notes 
Note 1. For more information, see https://www.seer.cancer.gov/causespecific/ (accessed on 6/29/2018). 
Note 2. These statistics were calculated using the Area Health Resources File. 
Note 3. It may not be a coincidence that these are the two cancer sites for which routine screening is 
common and recommended. MA plans may encourage cancer screening (Baker, Phillips, Haas, Liang, 
& Sonneborn, 2004; and Rizzo, 2005) 
Note 4. See https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2018-Fact-sheets- 
items/2018-04-26.html (accessed on 7/1/2018). 
